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SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF STATE SALES AND USE TAXES
ROBERT C. BROWN*
Outside of the federal field-and it has its possibilities
there too--there has been no more striking tax phenomenon
in the past few years than the development of sales and use
taxes. These are not wholly new, but their tremendous de-
velopment in scope and importance came within the last
decade. With the tendency of the states to withdraw largely
from the property tax field in favor of the local sub-divisions,
the state sales tax, with the supplement of the use tax, has
become one of the largest sources of revenue; and compara-
tively few are the states which are not now making increas-
ing use of this expedient. It may indeed be added that sev-
eral of our larger municipalities are embarking more or less
upon the same course.
The present paper is an attempt to consider the more
important legal problems which are presented by these taxes.
The economic problems must be largely left to those more
qualified.' However, it is impossible to disregard entirely
the most important economic argument which has been made
against these taxes-namely, that they are regressive or, to
use more colloquial language, that they are poor man's taxes.
By this is meant that the tax burden is upon the consumer,
and that since the rich man does not consume an amount
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law. This paper is
based upon an address given by the author at the National Tax
Conference at St. Paul, Minnesota, Oct. 14, 1941.
See King, "Various Tax Theories and their Current Applications"
(1941) 19 Taxes, 583.
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greater in proportion to his riches, the poor man bears more
than his fair share of the total tax burden.
This argument obviously rests heavily upon the assumption
that the sales tax is fully passed on by the seller, who for-
mally pays it, to the consumer. Here we need only consid-
er the sales tax itself, since the use tax, as will presently
appear, was at least originally conceived of merely as a sup-
plement to the sales tax for the purpose of preventing its
avoidance in circumstances where evasion was otherwise
possible. Even so, the validity of the assumption that a
sales tax is passed on has been challenged by several author-
ities.2 It is certainly true that under unusual circumstances
even a sales tax imposed by a statute which requires it to
be passed on will not always be entirely escaped by the seller.
Thus it has been held that the New York City sales tax is
such an obligation of the seller that the city has a prior claim
on his bankruptcy, even though the act imposing the tax
contemplates and really requires that the tax burden be
passed on to the purchasers. 3
But on the whole it seems probable that the bulk of the
tax burden is borne by the consumer in normal circumstances,
and therefore the argument of regressiveness is of some
weight. On the other hand, this disadvantage is minimized,
if not entirely wiped out, by a selective sales tax, since then
the tax can be imposed only with respect to commodities not
ordinarily purchased by persons of moderate means. Fur-
thermore, the undoubted regressive effect of a general sales
tax is minimized by the use of other taxes falling more heav-
ily upon persons of large resources, notably the net income
tax. At any rate, the enormous productivity of the sales
tax, even in periods of comparative financial stress, is likely
to insure not merely its maintenance, but its continual ex-
tion. Nor, so far as one can see, will war conditions af-
fect other than favorably upon the employment of this tax.
It is true that the war may reduce certain state and local
burdens connected with relief-as evidenced by the recent
reduction of the New York City sales tax. But by the same
token the tax must be retained and later probably increased
in order to take care of the enormous relief demands which
2 See Warren & Schlesinger, "Sales and Use Taxes. Interstate Com-
merce Pays its Way," (1938) 38 Col. L. Rev. 49. See also, Pierce,
"The Place of Consumer's Excises in the Tax System," (1941) 8
Law & Contemporary Problems, 430.
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will presumably arise when the expected post-war depression
appears.
Apart from problems of interstate commerce and trade
barriers, which will be considered hereafter, there appear to
be no serious legal difficulties in the way of this tax. Since
it is an excise tax, the strictest equality and uniformity pro-
visions of state constitutions do not generally affect it. To
be sure, the federal Supreme Court decided a few years ago
in Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis4 that a sales tax cannot
be imposed at a graduated rate-that is, that it cannot be
increased in rate as the amount of sales by the particular
seller increase.
This decision was by only a six to three vote, and there
is no great probability that it would be adhered to by the
present Court. In fact it seems quite doubtful in principle.
It is true that if the tax is fully passed on there seems no
reason why a person should pay more because he has bought
from a larger store. But a graduated tax would probably
be more difficult to pass on, as against competitors paying
a lower rate, and the higher rates would, it seems, be borne
at least in part by the larger stores as overhead. It is true
also that a graduated sales tax is more objectionable than a
graduated net income tax; but the Kentucky law invalidated
in the Stewart case had a maximum rate of 1 per cent, which
because of the lower brackets could never be fully reached.
The invalidation of a sales tax on the basis of this very
slight measure of graduation seems unjustified, and the dis-
senting opinion by Mr. Justice Cardozo quite unanswerable.
But even if this doctrine is adhered to, there seems no
reason to think that the utility or progress of the sales tax
will be much hampered. While it seems unwise to deprive
the taxing authorities of the right to make some small
measure of graduation of rates if deemed desirable, yet grad-
uation of sales taxes was not used much before the Stewart
case, and it is undoubtedly possible to impose an effective
and productive sales tax at a uniform rate.
One other problem has caused some difficulty in some
states, notably Illinois. This is the question what constitutes
a sale of tangible personal property-the usual basis of the
tax. It seems that this is largely a question of the law of
3 New York v. Feiting, 313 U.S. 283 (1941).
'294 U.S. 550 (1935).
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sales, and that, in the absence of specific provisions of the
statute to the contrary, all sales should be taxed. Nor should
any distinction be made because of the particular title of the
act-the distinction between a so-called sales tax and a re-
tailer's occupation tax or something of the sort measured by
sales, being obviously merely verbal, so far as this problem
is concerned.5 On the other hand, a contract for repairs is
not to be regarded as a taxable sale, even though the repair-
man adds some materials to the repaired article, merely as
a necessary incident to performing his services.6
Use Taxes
The use tax has made an even more recent but almost
equally spectacular entrance upon the stage. It is clearly a
tax imposed upon the consumer, so that no problem of pass-
ing on is involved. Presumably such restrictions as there
are on sales taxes, such as the possible prohibition of a grad-
uated rate, apply to use taxes also; but graduation is still
less needed here.
The close connection between sales and use taxes ap-
pears from the fact that the latter were originally intended
only to supplement sales taxes. For many years it was, or
was supposed to be, the law that a sales tax could not be
imposed directly by any state upon interstate commerce
transactions, on the ground that this was a prohibited regu-
lation of interstate commerce.7 This rule was rigidly limited
by the courts. Thus in Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania,8 it was
held that a state might tax the sale of petroleum to a pur-
chaser in that state, though the contract provided for a ship-
ment from a point outside the state, and this agreement was
carried out. The Court held that since the goods could have
been procured from the seller in the taxing state, the inter-
state shipment was unnecessary, and was therefore not en-
titled to the exemption from state sales tax.
But this rule of exemption could not be escaped by the
states when, as frequently happens, the goods are not pro-
5 But cf. Mahon v. Nudelman, 36 N.E. (2d) 550 (Il., 1941).
6 This matter was fully discussed by the Supreme Court of Illinois in
Mahon v. Nudelman, supra, note 5; but the application of the rule
in that case is somewhat questionable.
7 See for a discussion of the earlier authorities, Lowndes, "State Tax-
ation of Interstate Sales," (1935) 7 Miss. L. J. 223.
8294 U.S. 169 (1935).
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curable from the seller, or perhaps at all, within the state
of the purchaser, which is the state generally seeking to
impose the tax. The use tax was therefore imposed upon
the consumers in sales tax states who bought goods in inter-
state commerce, thereby escaping the sales tax. The rate
of the use tax was usually equal to that of the sales tax,
and the obvious intent, and the substantial result, was to
equalize the burden, and thereby protect both the state rev-
enues and the local merchants. It was upon this general
theory that the use tax was originally justified.'
However, this particular justification has departed with
the ending of the restriction on the state taxing power which
the use tax was intended to escape. The decision in 1940
of the federal Supreme Court in McGoldrick v. Berwind-
White Coai Mining Co.'0 substantially overruled the previous
restrictive authorities, by holding that the jurisdiction of the
purchaser may impose a sales tax with respect to goods even
necessarily purchased in interstate commerce.
This decision, regarded as rather revolutionary, does not,
on analysis, seem actually so. It merely gave the death blow
to a doctrine which, while insistently stated, was actually
already moribund. The whole doctrine had been more and
more closely confined by exceptions," but even where it
definitely applied, there were rather simple expedients for
depriving it of nearly all effect.
In the first place, there was the doctrine of American
Manufacturing Co. v. St. Louis,"2 that a license tax could be
imposed upon a local manufacturer measured by goods sold,
even though these sales were exclusively in interstate com-
merce. The theory was that this tax was not a tax upon
interstate commerce but rather upon the local manufactur-
ing business. But the difference in terminology and theory
does not change the fact that the burden is, or may be made,
precisely the same as a tax upon the sales. The verbal dis-
tinction which the court insisted upon between measure and
0 See Mann v. McCarroll, 198 Ark. 628, 130 S. W. (2d) 721 (1939).
10 309 U.S. 33 (1940). The case involved the sale of anthracite coal by
a producer in Pennsylvania (in which state all anthracite in this
country is produced) to a New York City purchaser. The New
York City sales tax was held to be properly imposed upon this
transaction.
" See Wiloil Corp. v. Pennsylvania, supra, note 8.
22250 U.S. 459 (1919).
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subject is a beautiful example of one without a substantial
difference. 3
But if this were not enough, the use tax itself, which
was previously sustained by the federal Supreme Court,'4
enabled the states to entirely avoid the unfortunate effect of
the old rule. If the state is prohibited from taxing the sale
but can impose the same tax directly upon the consumer sim-
ply by calling it a use tax, the state is no worse, and the
consumer is certainly no better off, at least so far as the
use tax is as effectively collectible as the sales tax, a prob-
lem which will be considered later. The use tax cases had
therefore settled the economic issue and the Berwind-White
case merely sensibly recognized the fact. 5 It is to be noted,
however, that this frank subjection of interstate transactions
to state sales taxes has removed the original justification
for use taxes, and if they are to be continued, some other
reason for them must be found.
The Trade Barrier Aspect
Before considering what the states ought to do with
respect to this problem, it is important to consider whether
the present situation is satisfactory from the standpoint of
the national interest, and more particularly from the stand-
point of the possibility of trade barriers. Notice that not
much emphasis is now laid upon the problem of interstate
commerce. The Berwind-White case1 6 has seemed to remove
any necessity of discussing that problem in this connection.
We seem to be approaching, if we have not already reached,
that paradise where everything is interstate commerce for
purposes of federal regulation (especially labor regulation)
and nothing is interstate commerce so far as state taxing
power is concerned. But if this new dispensation is leading
us into serious trade barriers, we should certainly watch our
step.
's There are a number of other cases applying this doctrine sometimes
under rather extreme circumstances. Typical of these are Hope
Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927), and Utah Power & L. Co.
v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932).
34Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
'1 See Powell, "New Light on Gross Receipts Taxes," (1940) 53 Hary.
L. Rev. 909. It has even been argued that a use tax is a more
direct burden upon the consumer than the sales tax, because the
consumer inevitably bears the burden of the use tax. See the note
in (1940) 16 Ind. L. J. 260.
'BSupra, note 10.
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Until recently one would have supposed it unnecessary
to argue this point. But the idea has risen in some quarters
that trade barriers between states are innocuous or even
desirable. To this it should be sufficient to say that the
fundamental reason for the adoption of our original con-
stitution was to do away with existing trade barriers, and
thereby to have a national economy. If this is considered
too antiquated a theory to be advanced at present, it still
seems reasonable to say that present events abroad do
not indicate any great desirability of splitting up this country
into separate small economic units, with no communication
other than political.
A more subtle, but not less effective, way of excusing
trade barriers is to say that it is a problem for Congress,
and that the courts should not interfere. Mr. Justice Black,
practically from the time of his appointment, has vigorously
championed this view of judicial self-abnegation or neglect
of duty, whichever one pleases to call it.'1 Two still more
recent appointees to the Court, Justices Frankfurter and
Douglas, have indicated some sympathy for this view ;18 and
perhaps other members of the Court may follow them.
But, as already said, this is really nothing but indis-
criminate approval of trade barriers, and so does not seem
desirable. An omniscient Congress with nothing else to do
would have its work cut out for it to block in advance all
ingenious schemes which the states might concoct for "pro-
tecting," as they call it, their local industries from those in
other states. And Congress, however nearly it approaches
omniscience, still has quite a number of other things to do.
Besides all this, if a national court is to resign the respon-
sibility of preventing the states from blocking trade with
other states, by taxation or otherwise, it is hard to see what
function the court has left, at least so far as the states
1 See his dissenting opinions in Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S.
307 (1938) and in Gwin -v. Henrneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939), in the
latter of which he suggests that Congress might deem such trade
barriers as desirable in some situations.
'sJustices Black, Frankfurter and Douglas joined in a dissenting
opinion in McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176(1940), which opinion was based in considerable degree upon the
same doctrine that the Court should leave the correction of trade
barriers between the states to Congress. The writer of this opin-
ion is not specified.
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are concerned.19 No doubt if the courts will not compel the
states to behave, and the states do not behave voluntarily,
Congress will interfere; but the interference will almost in-
evitably be in a manner so crude and harsh as to destroy
many of the good and desirable as well as the bad exercises
of state taxing power.20  It will be far better for the states
themselves if the courts help them to solve this problem, than
if it is left to Congress.
Of course taxes are not the only trade barriers. Nor
are sales and use taxes inevitably the worst tax barriers.
Indeed such chain store taxes as have been imposed in some
states, notably Louisiana, 21 are probably far worse.
Another concession must be made, and an important
one. The doctrine of the Berwind-Wkite case does not nec-
essarily involve any trade barriers. If it did, use taxes, at
least as applied to interstate transactions, which is probably
their chief purpose, would likewise be objectionable. In
both instances there is no penalty for buying goods from an
out-of-state seller; the sales tax or the use tax merely equals
the tax which would have been imposed if the purchase had
been made within the state. In other words, the new doc-
trine does not necessarily discriminate against interstate
commerce, but merely removes a discrimination in favor of
interstate commerce. Such is obviously not a trade barrier,
which can hardly exist except by discrimination against in-
terstate commerce. Indeed a removal of a discrimination in
favor of interstate commerce not only sets up no trade bar-
rier but seems clearly desirable.
A sales tax imposed solely upon interstate transactions
would undoubtedly be a trade barrier, but probably even
the present Supreme Court would invalidate it as discrimin-
atory against interstate commerce. Even the "reconstituted"
Supreme Court has without hesitation and unanimously in-
validated state taxes which were deemed to plainly discrim-
19 See Powell, "1939-40 Supreme Court Decisions on State Taxation of
Interstate Commerce," (1940) 26 Bulletin of the National Tax As-
sociation, 23.
20 See Truitt, "Joint Federal-State Attack Upon Trade Barriers," Chap.
XXVIII of the Symposium on "Tax Barriers to Trade," published
by the Tax Institute, Philadelphia, 1941.
21 Here the tax rate is steeply graduated according to the number of
stores wherever situated, whether inside or outside Louisiana. This
scheme was sustained in Gt. A. & P. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S.
412 (1937).
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inate against interstate commerce.2 2  Of course no discrim-
ination appears if a substantially similar tax burden is im-
posed upon intrastate transactions, thus equalizing the bur-
den.2 3 Similarly, a use tax solely upon goods purchased
outside the state would be invalid if it stood alone; but since
it generally applies only where the purchase has not been
subjected to an equal sales tax, there is no real discrimination
and no substantial trade barrier.24
On the other hand, if both the state of the seller and
the state of the buyer impose a sales tax, the situation is
rather different. Here we have two sales taxes to pay if
the transaction is in interstate commerce, and but one if the
sale is entirely consummated within one state. This is not
merely a conceptual burden upon interstate commerce, but
it seems to be a substantial trade barrier. Granting that
sales taxes are not fully passed on to the consumer, it is
submitted that they are passed on to an extent which would
seriously discourage interstate transactions and therefore
set up substantial trade barriers. Perhaps there is no ap-
parent discrimination against interstate commerce and in
favor of purchasing within the state; but such discrimination
exists, all the same.-5
The Berwind-White case does not of itself sanction any
such double burden. There the tax sustained was imposed
by the jurisdiction of the purchaser alone; or at least no
sales tax by the state of the producer was shown, or even
less sustained. However, the same result might perhaps
be obtained by an excise tax by the producing state measured
by sales, as in the St. Louis case28 previously referred to.
No doubt influenced by these considerations, several
commentators have suggested that an interstate sale may be
22 Hale v. Bi-mxo, 306 U.S. 375 (1939), opinion by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter; Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1940), opinion by Mr.
Justice Reed. Mr. Justice Black's concurrence with this doctrine,
in spite of its apparent inconsistency with his advocacy of judicial
self-abnegation with reference to trade barriers, is shown not only
by his concurrence in these decisions, but also by express language
in his dissenting opinions cited in note 17, supra.
23 Gregg Dying Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472 (1932).
24 See Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett,'276 U.S. 245 (1928).
25 See McNamara, "Jurisdictional and Interstate Commerce Problems
in the Imposition of Excises on Sales," (1941) 8 Law & Con-
temporary Problem, 482.
26 American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, supra, note 12.
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taxed only by the state of the purchaser.2 7 As already shown,
this seems to be a satisfactory solution, and avoids any seri-
ous possibility of trade barriers of this kind. But no square
authority can apparently be found for this proposition, at
least in the federal courts, and there is at least one state
decision directly to the contrary. This is the recent case of
O'Kane v. State,28 decided by the New York Court of Appeals.
This sustained a New York stock transfer tax (essentially a
sales tax on corporate stock) imposed on sales of stock by New
York sellers to out-of-state purchasers. The opinion of the
majority purports to rely upon the Berwind-White case, and
says that a sales tax by the jurisdiction of the purchaser would
not result in a multiple burden, since the tax by the purchas-
er's jurisdiction would be on a different taxable event-name-
ly, the purchase rather than the sale. This is obviously another
excursion into pure verbal metaphysics. When one comes
down to earth, there has been one event and it has been sub-
ject to two taxes. This is a strong inducement to "buy at
home," which may be a good slogan sometimes, but is not
good constitutional law or practice. It is submitted that this
scheme should not be permitted.
The use taxes are often designated as "compensatory"
since they normally allow a credit for the amount of sales
taxes of the same state paid by the person upon whom the
use tax is imposed. But suppose the sales tax has been paid
to another state? Then the use tax is certainly not com-
pensatory in any realistic sense, unless a similar allowance
is made for the sales tax of such other state, as does not
seem to be the usual practice.
Of course the problem of the correct verbal characteriza-
tion of the tax is far less important than whether such a
use tax, making no allowance for out-of-state sales taxes, is
in fact an effective trade barrier. It should be noted, how-
ever, that the courts occasionally attempt to evade a direct
answer to this question by shuffling the various taxes by
name-as the New York court did in the O'Kane case.
Passing from such verbal metaphysics to actualities, it
must still be conceded that under some circumstances, a use
tax which fails to allow for a sales tax imposed by another
27 See e.g., Vaske, "Are You Selling in Foreign States?", (1941) 19
Taxes, 467. Cf. McNamara, op. cit., note 25, supra.
28 283 N.Y. 439. 28 N.E. (2d) 905 (1940).
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jurisdiction is unobjectionable. For example, if no sales tax
can be imposed except by the state of the purchaser, there
is no possibility of this problem even arising; but as already
shown, it is by no means certain that the the state of the
seller is precluded from imposing the tax. Furthermore, such
a use tax imposed by a jurisdiction like New York, which
imposes no personal property taxes, may be all right, since
the use tax may well be regarded as in lieu of a property tax.
And on somewhat similar reasoning, a tax on the use of
gasoline or similar commodities as a fuel for transportation
need not make any allowances for out-of-state sales taxes,
since the use tax is itself proportioned to the actual consump-
tion in the state and is in no way supplementary to a sales
tax ;29 indeed in such cases the same state will often impose
both a sales and a use tax without either tax making any
allowance for the other.30
But where, as is usual except in the situation just men-
tioned, the use tax is supplementary to the sales tax and
makes allowance for the sales tax paid by the purchaser
to the same state, the imposition of a use tax without allow-
ing for a sales tax actually collected by the state of the seller
is a definite trade barrier, at least to the extent that the
burden of the sales tax is passed on to the purchaser. This is
because a purchase from a seller outside the state involves
at least a possible sales tax in that state plus a use tax in
the state of the purchaser's residence or place of business;
whereas a purchase from a seller within a state involves only
one such tax, or, if both taxes are exacted, the total amount
will be only that of the larger of the two taxes. Whether
or not there is a difference in form, there is certainly the
difference in substance that in an interstate sale the amount
of the sales tax will be added to the use tax. This would
seem to be at least potentially a substantial trade barrier.
If the imposition on the same transaction of a sales tax by
two states is objectionable-and even the most vigorous ad-
vocates of liberalism in construing state taxing power seem
to admit that it is31-a use tax which allows for a sales tax
29 Unless such a use tax with respect to transportation fuel is reason-
ably proportioned to use within the taxing state, it will usually be
invalidated as a burden on interstate commerce. McCarroll v.
Dixie Greyhound Lines, supra, note 18.
30 See Brown, "The Legal Aspects of Trade Barriers," (1940) 25 Bul-
letin of the National Tax Association, 98.
31 See McNamara, op. cit., note 25, supra.
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paid to the same state but not for a sales tax paid to another
state seems likewise improper.2
But assuming that all of this is true, the question still
remains whether the courts will interfere. The courts cer-
tainly do not invalidate all trade barriers, and perhaps they
are right in this, though it still seems that no substantial
barriers should be permitted. 3
The first decision of the federal Supreme Court sus-
taining a general state use tax, Henneford v. Silas Mason
Co.,34 involved a Washington tax, which expressly gave a
credit for all sales taxes imposed upon the acquision of the
article by the taxpayer, whether such tax was imposed by
the state of his own domicile or some other. The Court
seized upon this provision as demonstrating that there was
no improper burden upon interstate commerce, since the to-
tal tax burden was the same whether the transaction was
interstate or intrastate. This seems quite convincing, but
by itself would indicate that the Court would insist upon
such a provision in all state use tax laws. However, the
writer of the opinion (Mr. Justice Cardozo) added a distinct-
]y disturbing caveat to the effect that such a provision is
unnecessary. In the course of this he said, "A state, for
many purposes, is to be reckoned as a self-contained unit,"
an idea which seems not only inconsistent with the whole
principle of our economic national solidarity, but also with
the statement-of the same jurist in an earlier case,"5 which
invalidated an attempt by one state to prescribe the price
paid for milk produced in another state merely because the
mill was sold in the state seeking to impose the regulation.
Mr. Justice Cardozo said that such a regulation would violate
the principle that a state cannot be permitted to put itself
in a position of "economic isolation." It is submitted that
this earlier idea of Mr. Justice Cardozo was much sounder
than the theory which he propounded in the Silas Mason case.
Unfortunately, however, Mr. Justice Cardozo's success-
ors have seemed more favorable to his "self-contained unit"
32 This matter is more fully discussed in Brown, "Judicial Trends with
respect to Trade Barriers," Chap. XXV of the Symposium on "Tax
Barriers to Trade," published by the Tax Institute, Philadelphia,
1941. See also the note in (1941) 6 Mo. L. Rev. 57.
3 See Waters, "Interstate Trade Barriers," (1941) 19 Taxes, 472.
34 Supra, note 14.
35 Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
[Vol. 18
STATE AND USE TAXES
idea of a state than to his disapproval of economic isolation.
To be sure, the Court has from time to time condemned state
taxes which were deemed to lead to the possibility of "mul-
tiple burdens." Thus in Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen,36 the
Indiana gross income tax (in this aspect a sales tax, though
covering other transactions than sales) was held inapplicable
(at least without apportionment) to an Indiana manufacturer
which shipped most of its products outside of that state.
The Court rested its decision primarily upon the proposition
that other states into which the products were sent could
impose a similar tax and that there would thus be a multiple
burden discriminatory against interstate commerce. The
opinion was written by Mr. Justice Roberts, and was unani-
mous except for Mr. Justice Black. It may be added that
Mr. Justice Roberts attempted to distinguish American Co.
v. St. Louis37 and cases following it, by saying that there
state excise taxes were involved, whereas the Indiana tax
was one on gross receipts. But after all, is not a gross re-
ceipts tax one kind of an excise tax, and a rather burdensome
one, at that?
Similarly the Court, and again with Mr. Justice Black
the sole dissenter, invalidated in Gwin v. Henneford,38 a
Washington gross receipts tax on a domestic selling agent
for local fruit growers, most of the sales being in interstate
commerce. Here too the Court was impressed with the
probability of multiple burdens by reason of the power of
states where the fruit was sold to impose similar taxes. The
prevailing opinion in this case was written by Mr. Justice
Stone, now the Chief Justice.
From these cases, one might think that sales taxes could
be imposed only by the state of the purchaser, and so that
there is no possibility of multiple burdens. But in the first
place, the Court has not always adhered to this doctrine,
and has (though without much consideration of this aspect
of the matter) sustained state taxes involving interstate
transactions where the same, or nearly the same, possibility
of multiple burdens appeared. 8 Furthermore, the multiple
burden doctrine was criticized, or at most followed without
88 Supra, note 17.
'3 Supra, note 12.88Supra, note 17.
39 Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
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enthusiasm, in the Berwind-White case.40 Chief Justice Stone,
even though he concurred in the Adams case and wrote the
opinion in the Gwin case, is no longer enthusiastic about them,
and will certainly hold them to their narrowest implications.
At any rate, we are not left to mere speculation and to
use taxes; for when this very problem of a non-compensatory
use tax came before the Court, it declined to apply its sup-
posed prohibition of multiple burdens. The case referred to
is Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher,41 where California use
tax was sustained, notwithstanding the fact that the law
explicitly refused any credit for out-of-state sales taxes.42
The opinion in this case was written by Mr. Justice Reed.
He cited the Silas Mason case as conclusive, as indeed it is
if we accept the dictum in it, already referred to. Mr.
Justice Reed tries to persuade himself that there is no dis-
crimination, on the ground that use within a state is not
interstate commerce. This is another example of trying to
ignore actualities by clever use of terms. However, he final-
ly frankly concedes the possibility of discrimination, but holds
that it should not be interfered with until actual discrimina-
tion is shown, and perhaps not even then. 43
The answer to the question whether the Court will com-
pel an allowance for an out-of-state sales tax has therefore
not been definitely made; but the prognosis does not seem
very hopeful. Even if the Court does refuse to abdicate its
power and responsibility to prevent serious trade barriers
between the states, it is not very likely to interfere in this
situation. The Court is likely to be persuaded by a combina-
tion of the arguments that this barrier is not a serious one,
especially in view of the uncertainty as to how far sales
taxes are actually passed on to the buyer; that any such
prohibition could probably be evaded by the use of excise
taxes on production; and that in any event the state is a
"self-contained unit" and its taxing power should not be
40 Supra, note 10. The Adams case, supra, note 17, was clearly
criticized, though not overruled.
41306 U.S. 167 (1939).
42 Since the Silas Mason decision, supra, note 14, the Washington use
tax law has also been amended so as to deny any credit for sales
taxes imposed by other states.
4S The Court states that this "argument" need not be resolved until
a taxpayer shows-that he actually pays twice. When the Court
speaks thus, it clearly indicates that it has not made up its mind
that such double payment is an undue burden.
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restricted by that of other states. It must be granted that
we should not expect the courts to solve all our difficulties
for us, though it would seem that this is serious enough to
justify their interference. But it seems rather improbable
that they will help in this situation, unless indeed they do
prohibit any sales tax except by the state of the buyer. This
would automatically solve the difficulty, but here too one
cannot be very optimistic as to the probability of the Supreme
Court's prohibiting more than one tax.
Should Either the Sales Tax or the Use Tax Be Given Up?
Since the original basis for the use tax-that is to fill
in the gap in sales taxes on interstate transactions, a gap
which no longer exists-is not now available, the suggestion
has been made that the use tax should be given up by the
states, and the sales tax alone employed. Conversely, the
suggestion has been made that the sales tax be given up,
and the use tax take its place.
Theoretically, either tax will function satisfactorily
alone, and to adopt either of these suggestions would at least
partially solve the problem of trade barriers with respect
to them, which has just been discussed. But the practical
desirability of either suggestion depends upon the collect-
ibility as well as the legality of the imposition of the two
taxes. Accordingly, this problem of collectibility must be
given brief consideration.
It is obvious that a state can effectively collect a tax on
all sales within the state, even though the buyer intends to
transport the goods at once to another state, since here the
sale is purely within the taxing state.4 4  It is also possible,
though perhaps not entirely clear, that a tax may be col-
lected on all sales, no matter where the title passes, if ship-
ments are made to destinations within the taxing state.
While probably the tax cannot in such cases be collected by
ports-of-entry,45 nevertheless collection can probably be made
by methods analogous to those sustained with respect to use
taxes, as hereafter set forth.40  In the latter case, the seller
can be compelled to collect the tax imposed by the state
" Dept. of Treasury v. Wood Preserving Corp., 313 U.S. 62 (1941).
CSSee Brown, op. cit., note 30, supra.
46 Cf. Graubard, "Special Problems in the Levy of Municipal Excise
Taxes," (1941) 8 Law & Contemporary Problems, 613.
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where delivery is to be made. But it is completely impos-
sible to collect a tax on sales made to residents of the state
where the sale is outside the state and delivery is made
there. Obviously the seller cannot in any way be compelled
to collect this tax, whether or not he does business in the
taxing state, since he has no way of knowing the residence
of his customers. This difficulty can be largely avoided by
the use tax, but this very thing seems a decisive objection
to the proposal to abolish the use tax.
Now as to the use tax. Here the federal Supreme Court
has recently extended the power of the states to collect, and
has thus increased the desirability of employing the tax.
In Felt and Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher,47 the Court
held that a seller may be compelled to collect a use tax on goods
sold to purchasers within the'state even though the seller
was a foreign corporation and did no business within the
state except in respect to interstate sales. This doctrine was
more recently extended in Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 48
to permit a state to compel mail order houses doing business
in the state by conducting retail stores, to collect a use tax
on mail orders by residents of the taxing state. The Court
brushed aside the contention of the mail order houses that
their retail store business in the state was completely sep-
arate from their mail order business and therefore subjected
them to no liabilities in connection with the latter. The
position of the Court was that doing any kind of business
in the state, subjected the mail order houses to the liability
to collect the use tax with respect to all sales to known resi-
dents of the state.
All this is quite satisfactory from the standpoint of the
states; but, as the Court admits,49 this will not enable a state
to compel the seller to collect a use tax upon shipments into
the state if the seller does no business there.50 Still less can
47306 U.S. 62 (1939).
48312 U.S. 359 (1941). See also the companion case, Nelson v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941).
49 See Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra, note 48. The Court says
that practical difficulties of collection do not necessarily prove lack
of jurisdiction to impose the tax.
50 Some attempts have been made to compel the seller to collect the
tax in this situation by such extra-legal methods as suing certain
of his larger customers within the state for the tax, with the
purpose of destroying the seller's good-will. See Brown, "The
Future of Use Taxes," (1941) 8 Law & Contemporary Problems,
495. But such expedients are obviously of rather limited scope.
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an out-of-state seller be compelled to collect a use tax if the
sale is consummated and the goods delivered in the outside
state. This is true even though the seller does business in
the taxing state, for he has no way of knowing the residence
of purchasers who go outside the state to make their pur-
chases and take delivery there. In that situation neither sales
nor use taxes can be effectively collected, except by taking
the arduous course of going directly against the purchasers-
a scheme which will work very well in large transactions, but
is obviously impractical with respect to ordinary household
purchases.
On the whole then, the use tax seems more desirable, and
if either is to be given up it should be the sales tax. The
sales tax is desirable in that the state can go directly against
the few sellers rather than the numerous purchasers; but
the same is true of the use tax in many cases, and in those
where it is not, the sales tax is likewise largely ineffective.
But why give up either tax? While a sales tax has
perhaps no theoretical advantage over a use tax, yet ex-
perience shows that it is sometimes actually more desirable,
especially from the standpoint of collection procedure. And
the use tax has in many circumstances important advantages
over the sales tax. Why not choose between these advan-
tages by taking both?
As already indicated, the writer's opinion is that the
use tax should, in the usual case, be credited with all sales
taxes actually paid by the taxpayer to the state imposing
the use tax or to any other state. This last limitation is un-
necessary if it is finally decided that only the state of
the purchaser can impose a sales tax; but pending authori-
tative settlement of this question, it seems desirable. But at
least with this limitation, there seems no objection to the
imposition of both sales and use taxes by each state, and
no reason for any state to give up either of them.
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